Pilot CEOs and Corporate Cash Holdings by Chen, Lili et al.
  
Pilot CEOs and Corporate Cash Holdings 
 
 
Abstract 
We examine the effect of situation awareness developed from aviation training and 
experiences on corporate cash policies. We find that firms led by pilot CEOs are more likely 
to have higher cash holdings and higher market value of cash holdings. The findings suggest 
that pilot CEOs have greater situation awareness, and that these CEOs are more likely to plan 
ahead to cope with future liquidity needs. In addition, we find that the level of pilot 
certification is associated with corporate cash holdings and the value of cash holdings. These 
findings provide further evidence that situation awareness can be developed through training 
and aviation experience. We also find that the effect of pilot CEOs on corporate cash holdings 
is more pronounced for firms with high growth opportunities and firms with financial 
constraints. These results indicate that pilot CEOs tend to hold more cash when they are 
aware of future opportunities and risks.  
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“When I learned to fly, I had a crusty, seasoned instructor who gave me a piece of advice about 
flying that applies equally well to managing a company and executing strategy: “Plan your flight, 
and fly the plan.” - Trevor Fetter, CEO, Tenet Healthcare Corporation.1 
 
1. Introduction 
Do CEOs’ past experiences matter? CEOs are often considered to have the most important 
economic role in shaping corporate policies (Graham et al., 2013). Prior studies show that CEOs’ 
past experiences in life account for the variation in corporate policies that cannot be explained by 
traditional determinants such as firm, industry or market characteristics. For example, Bamber et 
al. (2010) find that CEOs’ different backgrounds in life affect their firms’ voluntary disclosures. 
Military training has been found to be associated with CEO managerial conservatism (Benmelech 
and Frydman, 2015), growing up during the Great Depression can create an aversion to risky 
capital and a preference to utilize tax benefits (Malmendier et al., 2011), and exposure to natural 
disasters can affect CEOs’ risk-taking behavior in corporate decision making (Bernile et al., 2017).  
Two recent studies have examined the effect of CEOs’ characteristics, captured by pilot 
certificates, on corporate outcomes. Cain and McKeon (2016) use the pilot certificate as a proxy 
for personal risk taking and find that pilot CEOs are associated with higher firm risk, as evidenced 
by higher stock return volatility. They also show that these CEOs have higher propensity to 
complete value-adding acquisitions for firms with high book-to-market ratios. Sunder et al. (2017) 
use the pilot license as a proxy for sensation seeking and find that pilot CEOs contribute to 
corporate innovation success through improving innovation effectiveness. Both studies use the 
pilot certificate as a proxy for intrinsic personalities such as risk taking and sensation seeking. 
                                                 
1 Available at https://www.dmagazine.com/publications/d-ceo/2007/may/meet-ceo-trevor-fetter/. 
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However, pilot CEOs could also develop situation awareness from the pilot training and aviation 
experience. While Cain and McKeon (2016) and Sunder et al. (2017) are silent on the situation 
awareness trait, it may help to explain why firms managed by pilot CEOs have the capacity to 
choose value-adding acquisitions, and diverse and original innovation projects. 
To further study how pilot CEOs affect corporate decisions, we focus on pilot CEOs’ situation 
awareness and examine its effect on corporate cash holdings. The reasons why we study corporate 
cash holdings are as follows. First, cash holdings are particularly important to firms as they affect 
nearly every corporate investment decision (e.g., Almeida et al., 2004; Almeida and Campello, 
2007), making managing cash reserves an important decision for firms. Second, setting corporate 
cash holdings is to a large extent at the discretion of managers (Belghitar and Clark, 2014). CEOs 
need to assess corporate situations and estimate future unknowns in order to determine corporate 
cash holdings (Dessaint and Matray, 2017). Therefore, corporate cash holding policy is an 
important and reasonable setting to examine whether pilot CEOs are sensitive to potential 
uncertainties and plan ahead to cope with anticipated liquidity risks. 
We expect firms led by pilot CEOs to have higher corporate cash holdings. Dessaint and 
Matray (2017) argue that situation awareness is required when deciding on a company’s cash 
policy, where the CEO and the management team is required to estimate future unknowns and use 
their predictions as inputs to make corporate decisions. They find that CEOs tend to increase 
corporate cash holdings when they anticipate any increase in liquidity risk. Since cash holdings 
can be used as a buffer against the risk of liquidity shocks (e.g., Opler et al., 1999; Almeida et al., 
2004; Han and Qiu, 2007; Campello, 2007; Qiu and Wan, 2015), changes in corporate cash 
holdings can indicate variations in CEOs’ perceived liquidity risk and preference for planning 
ahead. Prior studies show that pilot CEOs develop situation awareness from pilot training and 
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flying experiences, which endows them with the ability to better integrate available information 
and to plan ahead (e.g., Sarter and Woods, 1991; Endsley, 1995a, 1995b; Endsley and Garland, 
2000; Doane et al., 2004 ). Thus, it is possible that pilot CEOs are more aware of potential 
opportunities and risks, and hence are more likely to reserve cash as safety assets to respond to 
anticipated liquidity shocks. 
In contrast, counter arguments can be mounted to suggest that firms led by pilot CEOs are 
associated with lower corporate cash holdings. Cain and McKeon (2016) find that pilot CEOs are 
associated with risk-taking behavior and this risk-taking behavior has been shown to be associated 
with lower cash holdings. Specifically, CEOs with risk-taking behavior are less worried about 
corporate uncertainties and thus may not feel the need to hold cash to mitigate the potential 
liquidity risks (Bernile et al., 2017). In addition, risk-taking CEOs are less likely to constrain their 
spending, leading to less corporate cash holdings. 
We further predict that the value of cash holdings are higher for firms managed by pilot CEOs 
than other firms. Dessaint and Matray (2017) find that when making assessments for corporate 
decision making, CEOs can suffer from bias that is consistent with salience theories of choice. 
They find that managers overact to salient risks, leading to large distortion between perceived and 
actual risks, and consequently inefficient levels of cash holdings. Prior studies suggest pilot CEOs 
are apt at noticing minor elements, integrating available information, and planning ahead (e.g., 
Sarter and Woods, 1991; Endsley, 1995a, 1995b; Endsley and Garland, 2000; Doane et al., 2004). 
Therefore, they are less likely to be subject to behavioral biases, and are more superior in assessing 
potential risks and seizing potential opportunities, leading to higher value of cash holdings.  
An alternative prediction here is that the value of cash holdings is lower in firms led by pilot 
CEOs. If pilot CEOs are more likely to be risk takers, they are more likely to spend cash reserves 
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recklessly, leading to overinvestment and inefficiency. Moreover, the risk-seeking tendencies 
could spur CEOs to undertake projects with high uncertainties, resulting in higher losses. Thus, 
the value of cash holdings for firms led by pilot CEOs may be lower than those for firms led by 
non-pilot CEOs. 
We use pilot certificates as a proxy for situation awareness since CEOs’ flying activities are 
outside of the firms and are less likely to be subject to endogeneity concerns. The data on the pilot 
CEOs are hand collected using the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) online airmen 
credential records. We are able to obtain 245 pilot CEOs and 4,975 non-pilot CEOs, covering 
1,707 pilot-CEO firm-years and 16,053 non-pilot-CEO firm-years. Our findings show that firms 
led by pilot CEOs tend to hold more cash, and are more likely to have higher value of cash holdings.  
To provide evidence that situation awareness can be developed through training and aviation 
experience, we examine the effect of pilot certificate levels on corporate cash holdings and the 
value of cash holdings. These tests are based on the situation awareness literature, which suggests 
that expert pilots are more likely to achieve a higher level of situation awareness (Doane et al., 
2004; Endsley and Garland, 2000). The findings show that the level of certification has significant 
positive associations with corporate cash holdings and the value of cash holdings. In additional 
tests, we find that the effect of pilot CEOs on corporate cash holdings is more pronounced for firms 
with higher growth opportunities and for firms with financial constraints. These findings are 
consistent with our conjectures that pilot CEOs tend to hold more cash when they are aware of 
future opportunities and risks. 
Although our study is less likely to be subjected to endogeneity concerns, it is possible that 
firms with certain characteristics tend to hire pilot CEOs and that those characteristics could be 
related to corporate cash holdings. To alleviate the endogeneity concern, we conduct a CEO 
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turnover analysis following Sunder et al. (2017). The results are consistent with our main findings 
that firms led by pilot CEOs hold more cash relative to those led by non-pilot CEOs. We also 
check the robustness of our results by controlling for CEO military experience and also using an 
alternative measure of corporate cash holdings. Our results are robust and we continue to observe 
that firms managed by pilot CEOs have higher cash holdings. 
Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, it adds to the literature that 
investigates the effects of CEOs’ past experiences on their managerial styles and corporate policies. 
Prior studies find that the background of managers can influence their guidance disclosure styles 
(Bamber et al., 2010), ethical behavior (Benmelech and Frydman, 2015), and corporate policies 
(Malmendier et al., 2011, Bernile et al., 2017). Our study contributes to the literature by 
documenting an association between CEOs’ situation awareness and, both, corporate cash holdings 
and the value of cash holdings. These findings extend the evidence that CEOs’ past experiences 
are important in corporate decision making.  
Second, our study is complementary to two recent studies on pilot CEOs (Cain and McKeon, 
2016; Sunder et al., 2017). Cain and McKeon (2016) use pilot licenses as a proxy for CEOs’ risk 
behavior and find that firms managed by pilot CEOs are associated with higher risks. Sunder et al. 
(2017) use pilot licenses as a proxy for CEOs’ sensation seeking and find that pilot CEOs are 
related to firms’ innovation success. Different from their studies, we focus on the situation 
awareness of pilot CEOs and the development of situation awareness through training and aviation 
experience. We contribute to the literature on pilot CEOs by showing that different levels of 
situation awareness can affect corporate policies. 
Next, this study builds on the literature that investigates the determinants of corporate cash 
holdings. In addition to traditional determinants including firm, industry and market characteristics, 
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CEO characteristics such as risk taking (Bernile et al., 2017) and optimism (Huang-Meier et al., 
2016) also affect corporate cash holdings. However, CEOs’ situation awareness has not been 
documented. This study fills the gap in the literature by using pilot certificates as a proxy for 
situation awareness and studying the effect of situation awareness on corporate cash holdings. The 
findings propose an alternative determinant of corporate cash holdings. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature and 
develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design. Section 4 presents the sample 
selection and descriptive statistics. Section 5 discusses our main findings. Section 6 presents 
additional analyses and robustness checks. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1. Pilot CEOs and Situation Awareness 
In the aviation psychology literature, situation awareness is a well-documented factor 
attributed to pilot aviation safety and performance. Endsley (1995a) points out that 88% of aircraft 
accidents result from human factors and that the lack of situation awareness is one of these key 
factors. Since situations do not always go to plan, pilots need to be aware of changes, infer potential 
problems, and take actions to address any issues (e.g., Sarter and Woods, 1991; Endsley, 1995a, 
1996b, 2006; Endsley and Garland, 2000). Failing to notice potential risks can cause a loss of 
control (Doane et al., 2004).  
To be better at diagnosing and preventing potential risks, pilots are trained to develop and 
maintain situation awareness (Horne, 1997). According to the FAA pilot training program, in order 
to obtain a pilot certificate, individuals need to develop basic knowledge, make adequate planning, 
keep updating flight situations, predict potential changes, manage crew resources, and plan ahead 
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to deal with risks. Endsley (1995a), Horne (1997) and Doane et al. (2004) suggest that situation 
awareness developed from aviation training and experience allows pilots to assess current flying 
situations, predict future changes, and be prepared to deal with potential problems, which is 
essential to pilots’ flying performance and safety. 
    Endsley (1995b) categorizes situation awareness into three different levels. The basic level 
includes the perception of the elements in the environment. The second level involves the 
comprehension of the current situation. The third and highest level involves the projection of future 
status. Novice pilots can achieve the basic level, whereas proficient pilots are associated with a 
higher degree of situation awareness (Endsley 1995b; Endsley and Garland, 2000). Doane et al., 
(2004) conduct an experiment to examine pilots’ situation awareness and find that expert pilots 
are more sensitive to future changes, and are better at judging changes than novice pilots. 
2.2. Pilot CEOs and Corporate Cash Holdings 
Setting corporate cash holding policy to meet operation needs is to a large extent at the 
discretion of managers (Belghitar and Clark, 2014). Managers estimate future unknowns (e.g., 
customer demand, production costs, competition, and regulatory changes) and use their predictions 
as inputs to make corporate cash policy (Dessaint and Matray, 2017). Given that cash holdings can 
be used as a buffer against the risk of liquidity shocks (e.g., Almeida et al., 2004; Han and Qiu, 
2007; Opler et al., 1999) 2 , variations in CEOs’ perceived liquidity risk and preference for 
planning-ahead contribute to changes in corporate cash holdings.  
                                                 
2Cash holdings can be viewed as both a form of low risk investment and a source of financing (Keynes, 1936). Firms 
tend to accumulate cash since cash holdings can be used as a buffer against the risk of liquidity shocks, which is called 
the precautionary motive (Keynes, 1936; Opler et al., 1999). Based on the precautionary motive, firms with promising 
investment opportunities are more likely to accumulate cash since it allows firms to undertake valuable projects when 
they arise. The precautionary motive also suggests that firms facing financial constraints are more likely to accumulate 
cash because the influence of future shocks on firms’ cash flow will be aggravated when firms have limited access to 
the external capital market. Subsequent literature provides evidence to highlight the benefits of precautionary cash 
reserves for firms facing growth opportunities and financial constraints (e.g., Almeida et al., 2004; Han and Qiu, 2007; 
Almeida and Campello, 2007; Qiu and Wan, 2015).  
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CEOs with pilot certificates are more likely to develop a higher level of situation awareness 
from pilot training programs and aviation experience (Horne, 1997). According to the literature on 
pilot psychology (e.g., Doane et al., 2004; Endsley, 1995a, 1995b), pilots are able to better collect, 
integrate and assess available information, and are more aware of future opportunities and risks. 
Moreover, pilots are prone to plan ahead, and to be prepared to respond to potential opportunities 
and risks (e.g., Doane et al., 2004; Endsley, 1995a, 1996b, 2006; Endsley and Garland, 2000). 
Prior literature shows that CEOs’ past experiences in other fields account for the variations 
in corporate policies. Specifically, Bamber et al. (2010) find that managers with military 
experience are more likely to have more precise disclosure styles, while managers who were born 
before World War II are more reluctant to make forecasts. Malmendier et al. (2011) find that CEOs 
who grew up during the Great Depression have a preference for self-sufficiency and tend to avoid 
risky capital, while CEOs with battlefield experience are more prone to have aggressive corporate 
policies. Benmech and Frydman (2015) show that military CEOs are less likely to engage in 
corporate fraudulent activities and more likely to perform better during times of industry distress. 
Therefore, it is plausible that situation awareness developed from pilot training and aviation 
experience can influence pilot CEOs’ decision making in corporate policies. 
Given that pilot CEOs are better at integrating available information, are more aware of future 
opportunities and risks, and tend to plan ahead, it is possible that pilot CEOs are more likely to 
accumulate cash for a precautionary motive to cope with anticipated uncertainties and 
opportunities. Our first hypothesis is stated as follows. 
H1a: Firms managed by CEOs with pilot certificates are more likely to have higher corporate 
cash holdings. 
It is also possible that there could be a negative relationship between pilot CEOs and corporate 
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cash holdings. CEOs with pilot certificates are found to be associated with risk-taking behavior 
(Cain and McKeon, 2016). Higher risk taking indicates less demand for cash (e.g., Bernile et al., 
2017; Tong, 2010). Although pilot CEOs anticipate future situations, their risk-taking trait 
encourages them to be less worried about corporate uncertainties. Therefore, they are not prone to 
reserve cash as safe assets to mitigate liquidity risks. Also, it could be the case that pilot CEOs 
have a tendency to spend cash. For example, Cain and McKeon (2016) find that firms managed by 
pilot CEOs are more acquisitive than other firms, which indicates that pilot CEOs may rush to 
spend cash. As a result, CEOs with pilot certificates may take more risks and spend more cash, 
leading to less corporate cash holdings. 
H1b: Firms managed by CEOs with pilot certificates are less likely to have higher corporate 
cash holdings. 
2.3. Pilot CEOs and the Value of Cash Holdings 
Generally, CEOs are expected to make decisions for the sake of increasing firm value. 
However, prior literature in psychology suggests that individuals are subject to behavioral biases 
and do not always use all available information to estimate probabilities (e.g., Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1973, 1974). Graham et al. (2015) show that up to one half of CEOs make their 
investment decisions based on their “gut feeling”. Dessanit and Matray (2017) provide empirical 
evidence that CEOs pay attention to salient information and make mistakes in their assessment of 
firms’ situations, which contributes to the inefficient level of corporate cash holdings.  
        Pilot CEOs, who developed situation awareness from aviation training and experience, have 
the ability to process more available information related to their goals (e.g., Endsley 1995a, 1995b; 
Endsley and Garland, 2000). They are more sensitive to minor elements, are able to connect 
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seemingly unrelated factors successfully, and are better at assessing potential opportunities and 
risks (Doane et al., 2004). Therefore, CEOs with pilot certificates are less likely to be subject to 
behavioral biases and are more likely to invest in value-increasing projects, leading to higher value 
of corporate cash holdings.  
Furthermore, pilot CEOs tend to plan ahead and to prepare for future actions (e.g., Doane et 
al., 2004; Endsley, 1995a, 1996b, 2006; Endsley and Garland, 2000). It is possible that firms 
managed by these CEOs reserve cash so that they can quickly seize worthy projects. Qiu and Wan 
(2015) argue that seizing valuable opportunities generates great benefits for firms through 
enhancing the firms’ competitive advantage. These benefits attribute to investment efficiency and 
higher marginal value of cash holdings. Taken together, we expect that CEOs with pilot certificates 
could benefit firms through their ability to avoid making wrong judgements and their preference 
of planning-ahead. Our hypothesis is stated as follows. 
H2a: Firms managed by pilot CEOs are more likely to have higher value of corporate cash 
holdings. 
However, the value of cash holdings could be lower in firms led by CEOs with pilot 
certificates. If pilot CEOs are more likely to take risks, they may spend cash reserves recklessly, 
leading to overinvestment and inefficiency. In addition, the tendency to take risks may encourage 
CEOs to undertake projects with higher uncertainties (Cain and McKeon, 2016). Therefore, it is 
also possible that firms managed by these CEOs are more likely to experience losses from these 
projects, which is detrimental to the value of cash holdings. 
H2b: Firms managed by pilot CEOs are more likely to have lower value of corporate cash 
holdings. 
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3. Research Design 
3.1. Research Design for H1 
To examine the effect of pilot CEOs on corporate cash holdings, we estimate the following 
model: 
CASHi,t+1 = α + β1*PILOTi,t + β2*VEGAi,t + β3*DELTAi,t + β4*CASH_COMi,t + 
β5*OVERCONFIDENCEi,t  + β6*AGEi,t + β7*TENUREi,t + β8*NWCi,t + 
β9*LEVERAGEi,t + β10*CFL_VOLi,t + β11*MBi,t + β12*SIZEi,t + β13*DIVIDENDi,t + 
β14*CAPEXi,t + β15*AQUi,t + β16*CFLi,t + β17*R&Di,t + β18*TANGIBILITYi,t + 
β19*SALES_Gi,t + β20*ROEi,t + Industry FE + Year FE + εi,t                                                         (1) 
where CASH i,t+1 is the cash-to-asset ratio in year t+1. PILOTi,t is an indicator variable which 
is equal to one if the firm’s CEO has a pilot certificate and zero otherwise. We are interested in the 
coefficient on PILOTi,t. 
Following Cain and McKeon (2016), we control for CEO-specific variables, including CEOs’ 
incentives induced by their compensation contracts (VEGAi,t, DELTAi,t, and CASH_COMi,t), CEO 
overconfidence (OVERCONFIDENCEi,t), CEO age (AGEi,t), and CEO tenure (TENUREi,t). 
Specifically, VEGAi,t is the dollar change in CEO’s option holdings for a 1% change in stock return 
volatility. DELTAi,t is the dollar change in CEO stock and option portfolio value for a 1% change 
in stock price. CASH_COMi,t is the CEO’s cash compensation. OVERCONFIDENCEi,t is an 
indicator variable which is equal to one if the CEO vested the options exceeds the 100% moneyness 
in the current period or any prior period. AGEi,t is the natural logarithm of CEO age. TENUREi,t is 
the number of years of service as CEO at given firm.  
Following prior literature on corporate cash holdings (Fresard, 2010; Gao et al., 2013), we 
also control for a set of firm characteristics. Specifically, we include net working capital (NWCi,t), 
leverage (LEVERAGEi,t), volatility of cash flows (CFL_VOLi,t), market-to-book ratio (MBi,t), firm 
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size (SIZEi,t), an indicator variable which equals one if a firm pays a common dividend 
(DIVIDENDi,t), capital expenditures (CAPEXi,t), acquisition expenses (AQUi,t), free cash flow 
(CFLi,t), research and development expenditures (R&Di,t), assets tangibility (TANGIBILITYi,t), 
sales growth (SALES_Gi,t), and return on equity (ROEi,t). Detailed variable definitions and data 
sources are presented in Appendix 1. 
3.2. Research Design for H2  
To test H2, we examine the impact of pilot CEOs on the value of an additional dollar of cash 
to shareholders. We adapt the model from Faulkender and Wang (2006) by including the dummy 
variable for pilot CEOs and an interaction term between that variable and the change in cash 
holdings. We also control for CEO’s DELTA and VEGA in the regression since prior studies show 
that CEO’s DELTA and VEGA significantly affect the value of corporate cash holdings (e.g., Tong, 
2010; Liu and Mauer, 2011). The model is stated as follows. 
Ri,t – RBi,t = α + β1*PILOTi,t + β2*PILOTi,t*∆CASHi,t + β3*∆CASHi,t + β4*∆EARNi,t + β5*∆RDi,t + 
β6*∆NAi,t + β7*∆Ii,t + β8*∆Di,t + β9*CASHi,t-1 + β10*LEVi,t + β11*CASHi,t-1*∆CASHi,t 
+ β12*LEVi,t*∆CASHi,t + β13*NEWFINi,t + β14*DELTAi,t + β15*VEGAi,t + 
β16*DELTAi,t*∆CASHi,t + β17*VEGAi,t*∆CASHi,t + Industry FE + Year FE + εi,t          (2) 
where Ri,t is the stock return over fiscal year t-1  to t, which is estimated using monthly returns 
from CRSP. RBi,t represents firm i’s Fama and French 25-portfolio benchmark return over fiscal 
year t−1 to t. To determine the benchmark, we group every firm in our sample into one of the 25 
portfolios sorted by size and book-to-market. The excess return (Ri,t – RBi,t) is the difference 
between firm stock return over year t-1 to year t and the Fama and French 25 portfolios benchmark 
return over fiscal year t-1 to year t.  
PILOTi,t is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one for CEOs with pilot certificate 
and zero otherwise. ∆Xi,t represents a change in the variable X of firm i from year t-1 to t. (e.g., 
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∆CASHi,t = CASHi,t - CASHi,t-1). CASHi,t represents the total cash and marketable securities. 
EARNi,t represents earnings before extraordinary items. RDi,t  represents research and development 
expenses, set as zero if missing. NAi,t  represents net assets. Ii,t  represents interest expenses. Di,t  
represents common dividends payout. CASHi,t-1 represents the one year lagged cash and marketable 
securities. LEVi,t represents the sum of long-term debt and current liabilities. NEWFINi,t represents 
net new finance. DELTAi,t is the the dollar change in CEO stock and option portfolio value for a 
1% change in stock price. VEGAi,t is the dollar change in CEO’s option holdings for a 1% change 
in stock return volatility. All independent variables, except for PILOTi,t, DELTAi,t and VEGAi,t, are 
scaled by market value of equity at year t-1. 
 
4. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1. Sample Selection   
Our initial sample comprises of CEOs at US firms between 1992 and 2015. The data are 
retrieved from the ExecuComp database which mainly provides information on the top paid 
executives of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 1500 Index. This gives us 7,560 unique CEOs.  
We search for each CEO on the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) online airmen inquiry 
website.4 The name searching is based on the CEO’s first name, middle initial, and last name. If a 
CEO name does not produce a match in the FAA inquiry website, we categorize that CEO as a 
non-pilot. If a CEO name produces at least one name match in the FAA inquiry website, we 
categorize that CEO as a possible pilot. For these possible pilot CEOs, we need to further verify 
                                                 
4 The FAA website is https://amsrvs.registry.faa.gov/airmeninquiry/. The FAA website also provides a downloadable 
version of the airmen database. However, the downloadable database does not contain the date of birth of the pilot and 
their address information. As a result, we are unable to ensure the accuracy of the matches if simply matched the CEOs 
names using the FAA downloadable airmen database. Instead, we use the FAA online inquiry website to ensure the 
accuracy of matches and increase the sample size.   
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the accuracy of the matching. The procedure of verification differs slightly for the following two 
sample period: (1) 1992 to 2010 and (2) 2010 to 2015. This is because pilot CEOs data on the 
period 1992 to 2010 was shared with us by Cain and McKeon (2016).5 
For the sample period of 1992 to 2010, 4,346 non-pilot CEOs and 2,179 possible pilot CEOs 
are generated after searching for the CEOs names on the FAA online inquiry website. We ensure 
the accuracy of the matching by using the pilot CEOs list provided to us by Cain and McKeon 
(2016). We are able to identify the 179 pilot CEOs among the 2,179 possible pilot CEOs. 
Consequently, we deleted the 2,000 remaining names that were not matched. 
For the sample period of 2011 to 2015, 629 non-pilot CEOs and 406 possible pilot CEOs are 
generated after searching for the CEO names on the FAA online inquiry website. For this sample 
period, we need to use other information such as the CEO address or CEO’s date of birth to verify 
the accuracy of the matching. Since the CEO’s address can change, we use the date of birth to 
verify the matching. We collect the CEOs’ date of birth from LexisNexis, the Notable Names 
Database (NNDB), BoardEx, and public records. In some cases where the exact birth date is 
unavailable, we use only the month and year of birth. After entering the date of birth, if the match 
remains valid, we identify that CEO as a pilot. Due to limited access to CEOs’ biographical 
information and in particular the date of birth, we are only able to identify 66 pilot CEOs among 
406 possible CEOs names. We deleted the remaining 340 names that we are not able to verify, 
which is consistent with the sample selection criteria for the sample period 1992 to 2010. In the 
final sample, we have 245 pilot CEOs and 4,975 non-pilot CEOs. Our selection process for pilot 
CEOs and non-pilot CEOs is detailed in Figure 1. 
We obtain cash holding data from COMPUSTAT between 1989 and 2016. We require four 
                                                 
5 We would like to thank for the authors of Cain and McKeon (2016) for sharing their pilot CEO names. Their sample 
period is between 1992 and 2010, covering 179 pilot CEOs.  
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years of data (1989 through 1992) to compute cash flow volatility for the first year of our sample 
period.6 The stock returns data is obtained from CRSP. We exclude financial firms (SIC codes 
6000-6999) due to their special statutory capital requirements. We also exclude firms in the utility 
sector (SIC codes 4900-4999) because of their special regulatory environment. Any firms with 
incomplete data are excluded except for those with missing R&D expenditure (we set the missing 
R&D values as zero) and capital expenditure (again, we set the missing capital expenditure as 
zero). Our sample therefore consists of 1,707 CEO-pilot firm-year observations and 16,053 non-
pilot firm-year observations. In the analyses of the effect of pilot CEOs on the value of cash 
holdings, we further restrict our sample to firm-years that have positive market value of equity.  
4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the CEOs included in the FAA airmen certificates 
records. Panel A reports the different levels of pilot certificates held by CEOs. Among 245 pilot 
CEOs in our sample, 20 CEOs have student pilot certificates. According to the FAA airplane 
airman certification standards, student pilot is the lowest level of certification that a pilot can obtain 
and allows the pilot to fly alone in an aircraft. The majority of pilot CEOs (156) hold private pilot 
certificates which requires pilots to command a wide range of aircrafts but not for the commercial 
purpose. Pilots in this level exhibits satisfactory skills, knowledge and risk management. 15.5% 
and 8.2% of pilot CEOs reach higher levels, obtaining commercial and airline transport pilot 
certificates, respectively. According to the FAA pilot certificate level requirement, these two levels 
require more rigorous training and examination. Pilots’ insurance premium can be reduced if they 
                                                 
6 We collect our independent variable between 1992 and 2015. The sample period refers to the period that we examine 
the corporate cash holdings between 1993 and 2016. We download the Compustat data from 1988 because we need 
four years of lagged data to calculate volatility of cash flows, which measured by the standard deviation of annual 
changes of cash flow from operation over four-year lagged period.  
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hold higher levels of certificates, this is because higher levels of certificates are evidence of 
experience and better skills (Cain and McKeon, 2016).  
Panel B of Table 1 reports the certificate ratings held. The ratings provide pilots with a variety 
of “flight privileges”. Specifically, about 37% of the pilot CEOs hold an instrument rating, which 
permits them to fly under conditions in which the view is obstructed (Cain and McKeon, 2016). 
About a third of the pilot CEOs hold a multiengine airplane rating, which allows them to operate 
multiple-engine airplanes. As for the other class ratings, the pilots in our sample are able to fly 
helicopters (14), gliders (6), sea landing airplanes (9), and hot air balloons (2). 
Panel C of Table 1 reports the correlations among a variety of CEOs characteristics. The 
positive correlation between PILOT and VEGA/DELTA indicates that pilot CEOs are likely to have 
compensation packages with high risk incentives. This provides support for the need to control for 
DELTA and VEGA in the regression models. 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for all the variables used in our regression 
of corporate cash holdings. Panel B of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the pilot CEO 
sample and the non-pilot CEO sample separately. We perform t-tests to compare the sample means 
between the firms with pilot CEOs and firms without pilot CEOs.   
We find important differences in the characteristics of the firms in the two groups. Firms led 
by pilot CEOs are more likely to have relatively high cash holdings (CASH). Firms run by pilot 
CEOs are also more likely to have a higher leverage ratio (LEVERAGE), which is consistent with 
the findings of prior studies (e.g., Cain and McKeon, 2016). Also, pilot CEO firms are larger 
(SIZE), have lower net working capitals (NWC), have higher free cash flows (CFL), have more 
tangible assets (TANGIBILITY), and are more likely to pay dividend (DIVIDEND).  
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Perhaps not surprisingly, we find that CEOs with pilot certificates are more likely to have 
higher pay-performance sensitivity (DELTA) and higher risk incentives (VEGA) in their 
compensation packages, which is again consistent with the findings in Cain and McKeon (2016). 
In addition, pilot CEOs are relatively younger (AGE), have longer tenure, and have more cash 
compensation (CASH_COM).  
 
5. Main Results 
5.1. Effects of Pilot CEOs on Corporate Cash Holdings (Test of H1) 
Table 3 represents the regression results of cash holdings on firms with pilot CEOs and 
controls. The regression includes time fixed effects and industry fixed effects (i.e., year dummies 
and three-digit SIC code dummies). We use the one year ahead cash holdings as dependent variable 
to alleviate the endogeneity concern. The robust standard errors are clustered by year and firm 
level.  
We focus on the coefficient on PILOT, which captures the relation between pilot CEOs and 
corporate cash holdings. After controlling for firm characteristics and CEO characteristics, the 
coefficient on PILOT is 0.014, and it is statistically significant at the 5% significant level (p-value 
=0.049). This reveals that pilot CEOs are positively related to corporate cash holdings. The positive 
relation between pilot CEOs and corporate cash holdings is also economically significant. 
Specifically, pilot CEOs are associated with increases in corporate cash reserves of 0.014. The 
findings support H1a that firms led by pilot CEOs tend to hold more cash.  
With respect to the other CEOs characteristics, we find that coefficient signs and magnitudes 
on VEGA, DELTA and CASH_COM are similar to the findings of Tong (2010). VEGA is negatively 
related to the corporate cash holdings. The coefficient on VEGA is -0.003 and significant at 1% 
level (p-value = 0.006). This implies that firms managed by CEOs with higher risk-incentive have 
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a lower level of cash holdings. The coefficient on DELTA is 0.007 and statistically significant at 
1% level (p-value = 0.000). In addition, the results show that OVERCONFIDENCE is negatively 
related to corporate cash holdings, which is similar to the findings of Bernile et al. (2017). The 
coefficients on firm characteristics are generally consistent with prior studies (e.g., Tong, 2010; 
Liu and Mauer, 2011).  
5.2. Effects of Pilot CEOs on the Value of Cash Holdings (Test of H2) 
So far, the results show a positive relation between pilot CEOs and corporate cash holdings. 
To get a better understanding of whether this is beneficial or detrimental to the firms, we examine 
the value of cash holdings in firms managed by pilot CEOs. Table 4 reports the results of relation 
between pilot CEOs and the value of cash holdings. Standard errors are clustered by year and firm 
level. We find that the coefficient of the interaction term between PILOT and ∆CASH is positive 
and statistically significant at 5% level, which is 1.753 (p-value = 0.037). The findings are 
consistent with hypothesis H2a that firms managed by pilot CEOs are more likely to have higher 
value of cash holdings. Overall, the results support the interpretation that CEOs who have 
developed situation awareness are more superior in assessing potential projects. 
 
6. Additional Analyses and Robustness Checks 
6.1. Certificate Levels  
To further examine the effects of situation awareness, we conduct additional analyses based 
on the pilot certificate levels. As expert pilots are more likely to achieve high level of situation 
awareness (Endsley et al., 1998; Endsley and Garland, 2000; Doane et al., 2004; Endsley, 2006), 
we therefore expect CEOs with a higher level pilot certificate to have higher corporate cash 
holdings, than CEOs with a lower level certificate. We use Equation (1) and replace the PILOT 
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dummy variable with the HIGHLEVEL and LOWLEVEL dummy variables.7 HIGHLEVEL equals 
to one if the CEO has a certificate in FAA airmen database and the certificate level is above private 
pilot, and zero otherwise. LOWLEVEL equals to one if the CEO has a certificate in FAA database 
and the certificate level is below or equal to private pilot, and zero otherwise. 
Table 5 represents the results on the effect of CEOs with high level and low level of pilot 
certificate on corporate cash holdings. The estimated coefficient on CEOs with high level of 
certificate (HIGHLEVEL) is positive as expected. The magnitude of coefficient is 0.040, and 
statistically significant at 1% level (p-value = 0.009). Comparing with the coefficient on PILOT 
reported at Table 3, the coefficient magnitude is increased by 0.026 (0.040 - 0.014). While the 
estimated coefficient on CEOs with low level of certificate (LOWLEVEL) is positive and its 
magnitude is 0.005, it is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.481). The coefficients of control 
variables are generally consistent with the results of Table 3. The findings support our conjecture 
that CEOs with high pilot certificate level are more likely to have higher level of situation 
awareness. Furthermore, the differences between the coefficient magnitudes on CEOs with high 
certificate level and low certificate level support the pilot certificate as a reasonable proxy for 
situation awareness. That is because the situation awareness is increasing in pilots’ expertise while 
risk taking or sensation seeking is not. 
We further test the differences between the effects of pilot CEOs with high or low certificate 
level on the value of corporate cash holdings. We use Equation (2) and replace PILOT with 
HIGHLEVEL and LOWLEVEL. We substitute the interaction PILOT*∆CASH by two interactions 
(HIGHLEVEL*∆CASH and LOWLEVEL*∆CASH). The control variables are exactly as in Table 
4. Robust standard errors are clustered by year and firm level. We focus on the coefficients on the 
                                                 
7 The benchmark group comprises CEOs who do not hold a pilot certification. 
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HIGHLEVEL*∆CASH and LOWLEVEL*∆CASH. The expectations is that the coefficients on these 
two interactions remain positive, indicating that firms led by pilot CEOs are more likely to have 
higher value of cash holdings. We also examine the difference between the magnitude of 
coefficient on HIGHLEVEL*∆CASH and on LOWLEVEL*∆CASH.  
The results show that coefficients on the interaction terms are positive, consistent with the 
preceding findings that pilot CEOs contribute to higher value of cash holding in their firms. In 
addition, the coefficient on LOWLEVEL*∆CASH is not statistically significant, while coefficient 
on HIGHLEVEL*∆CASH is significant at 1% level (p-value = 0.007). The magnitude on 
HIGHLEVEL*∆CASH is much bigger relative to the magnitude on LOWLEVEL*∆CASH (5.796 
relative to 1.064). These findings are consistent with the interpretation that pilot CEOs with higher 
certificate levels are more likely to have higher level of situation awareness, which contributes to 
more efficient use of the cash holdings. 
6.2. Growth Opportunities  
To better understand if pilot CEOs with situation awareness are better at assessing situations 
and are more aware of future opportunities, we conduct additional tests on whether growth 
opportunities affect the effect of pilot CEOs on cash reserves. The industries are classified based 
on the SIC three-digit codes. Industry’s growth options are measured by market-to-book ratio at 
year t. Following Faulkender and Wang (2006), higher (lower) level of growth options is classified 
according to market-to-book above (below) the median. We then separate firms into two 
subsamples based on these firms with higher or lower industry’s growth options. We use regression 
(1) to perform this test, and the control variables are exactly as in Table 3.  
Table 7 reports the results of the subsample analyses. The first column reports the regression 
results of firms with lower growth opportunities. The coefficient on PILOT is 0.014, significant at 
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10% level. It indicates that pilot CEOs are associated with increase in corporate cash holdings of 
0.014 when firms have lower growth opportunities. The second column shows the regression 
results for firms with higher growth opportunities, where the coefficient on PILOT is 0.026 
(significant at 5% level). This indicates that pilot CEOs are associated with increase in corporate 
cash holdings of 0.026 when firms face higher growth opportunities. The coefficient magnitude 
on PILOT when firms have higher growth opportunities is almost double the coefficient magnitude 
on PILOT that firms have lower growth opportunities. These results suggest that the effect of pilot 
CEOs on corporate cash holdings is more pronounced for the firms with higher growth 
opportunities. These findings are consistent with our conjecture that pilot CEOs tend to hold more 
cash when they are anticipating higher growth opportunities. 
6.3. Financial Constraints  
To further investigate if pilot CEOs with situation awareness are better at assessing situations 
and more sensitive to future risks, we conduct tests to examine how financial constraints affect the 
effect of CEOs’ situation awareness. Following Alemeida et al. (2004), we measure financial 
constraints as the payout ratio, which is calculated as the sum of stock repurchase and dividends 
scaled by the total assets. We sort all firms for each year based on their pay-out ratio, and separate 
firms above and below the median into two subsamples, i.e., with financial constraints and without 
financial constraints. The control variables are exactly as in Table 3. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at year and firm level. 
Table 8 reports the results of subsample analysis. The first column represents the regression 
on firms that are not financially constrained. The coefficient on PILOT is positive but not 
statistically significant (p = 0.139). The second column show the regression for firms with financial 
constraints, where the estimated coefficient on PILOT is significant at the 5% level (p = 0.038). 
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Moreover, the magnitude of coefficient on PILOT (0.020) is larger for the financially constrained 
firms relative to the other firms (0.015). These results suggest that the effect of pilot CEOs on 
corporate cash holdings is more pronounced for the firms with financial constraints. The findings 
support our prediction that pilot CEOs with situation awareness are more prone to plan-ahead to 
cope with anticipated uncertainties.   
6.4. CEO Turnover  
We find firms led by pilot CEOs tend to hold more cash. However, it is possible that firms 
with certain characteristics tend to hire pilot CEOs and those characteristics could be related to 
corporate cash holdings. To mitigate the endogeneity concern, we focus on CEO turnover 
following Sunder et al. (2017) to investigate the change in corporate cash holdings. We select firms 
that have a CEO turnover at year t-1 and are able to obtain 391 pilot CEO turnover observations. 
We regress the change in cash holdings on PILOTTURNOVER. The PILOTTUROVER variable is 
equal to one when the firm has a non-pilot CEO at year t-1 and a pilot CEO at year t and is equal 
to negative one when the firm has a pilot CEO at year t-1 and has a non-pilot CEO at year t.8 The 
variable of interest is PILOTTURNOVER. The coefficient on PILOTTURNOVER reveals the effect 
of pilot CEO, comparing with non-pilot CEO, on corporate cash holdings for the same firm.  
We calculate the changes in variables between year t-1 and year t+1. Specifically, the 
change in cash holdings is measured as the difference between the cash-to-asset ratio after the new 
CEO takes office and the cash-to-asset ratio measured when the previous CEO was in power. We 
control for the changes in CEO characteristics. Similar to the calculation of change in cash holdings, 
we calculate the changes in control variables as the difference between these variables measured 
at year t+1 and year t-1. We do not include the changes in firm characteristics in regression because 
                                                 
8 It is important to note that we do not include an intercept in this model. 
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there are a lot of missing values in these variables and the sample size becomes very small if we 
control for them.  
Table 9 show the results for the subsample that firms with pilot CEO turnover. The estimated 
coefficient on PILOTTURNOVER is positive and statistically significant at 5% level (p-
value=0.013). The magnitude of the coefficient is 0.052. The findings support the notion that CEOs 
with pilot certificates have an active effect on corporate cash holdings.   
6.5. Controlling for Military Experience  
Some pilots served in the United State Air Force, and Cain and McKeon (2016) show that 
there is a positive correlation between the PILOT and MILITARY. It is possible that CEOs with 
military experience may developed risk-taking behavior during their service (Cain and McKeon, 
2016). In addition, CEOs with battlefield background are likely to developed situation awareness 
from being in combat (Riley et al., 2006). Thus, we perform an additional test by including the 
CEO military experiences and using a subsample from 2011 to 2016. We hand-collect military 
CEO data from LexisNexis. The sample used in the following analysis includes 61 military CEOs, 
covering 154 military CEO firm-year observations between 2011 and 2016. Table 10 represents 
the results after controlling for the CEO’s military experience (MILITARY). The estimated 
coefficient on MILITARY is positive but not significant. The estimated coefficient on PILOT 
remains positive and significant at 10% (p-value = 0.051). We continue to find that the pilot CEOs 
are positively related to corporate cash holdings. 
6.6. Alternative Definition of Cash Holdings  
We employ an alternative measure of cash holdings following Hanlon et al. (2017) to ensure 
that the prior findings on the positive relation between the pilot CEOs and corporate cash holdings 
are not driven by the choice of measures. Specifically, we use the log of cash-to-assets ratio as the 
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dependent variable to examine the effect of pilot CEOs on corporate cash holdings (Log (CASH)). 
Table 11 reports the results using the Log (CASH) as the dependent variable. The estimated 
coefficient on PILOT is positive and statistically significant at 1% (p-value = 0.008). Our findings 
that firms managed by pilot CEOs have higher cash holdings are robust to this alternative 
specification of cash holdings.  
 
7. Conclusion 
This study examines whether situation awareness proxied by pilot CEOs affects corporate 
cash holdings and the value of cash holdings. We find that firms led by pilot CEOs tend to hold 
more cash and are more likely to have a higher value of cash holdings. Consistent with the notion 
that the positive effects of pilot CEOs come from situation awareness, we further show that CEOs 
with a high pilot certificate level tend to hold more cash than CEOs with a low pilot certificate 
level. In addition, we find that the effect of pilot CEOs on corporate cash holdings is more 
pronounced for firms with higher growth opportunities and firms with financial constraints. The 
findings suggest that pilot CEOs with situation awareness are more likely to plan ahead to seize 
future opportunities and cope with anticipated uncertainties. 
This study has several implications. First, our results provide evidence that CEOs’ past 
experiences in life can have an effect on CEOs’ managerial styles. Specifically, pilot CEOs 
develop situation awareness from aviation training and flying experience, which can affect their 
decision-making relating to corporate cash holdings. Second, this study has practical implications 
for firms by providing an alternative explanation of why pilot CEOs are more likely to undertake 
value-adding acquisitions and diverse and original innovation projects. Firms may potentially use 
pilot certification to identify CEOs who are likely to be aware of potential opportunities and risks 
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and who tend to plan ahead. Third, this study provides additional insights into the determinants of 
corporate cash holdings and the value of cash holdings, suggesting that proxies such pilot 
certification may capture the characteristics of CEOs that may not be measured conventionally. 
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Fig. 1 
Sample Selection Process for Pilot CEOs  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Pilot CEOs 
Panel A: Distribution of CEO Pilots by Certificate Level 
Pilot certificate level   No. 
Student pilot 20 
Private pilot 156 
Commercial pilot 38 
Airline transport pilot 21 
No certificate display  10 
Total 245 
Panel B: Distribution of CEO Pilots by Certificate Rating 
Rating              No. 
Single engine airplane                   221 
Instrument rating                              90 
Multiengine airplane              83 
Helicopter             14 
Glider                        6 
Sea landing                               9 
Hot air balloon                                   2 
Panel C: CEO Characteristics Variable Correlations  
 PILOT VEGA DELTA CASH_CO
M 
CONF AGE TENURE 
 PILOT  1       
 VEGA 0.061* 1      
 DELTA 0.031* 0.595* 1     
 CASH_COM 0.031* 0.388* 0.379* 1    
OVERCONFIDENCE    0.000 -0.085*    -0.243* -0.053* 1   
 AGE   -0.021* 0.051* 0.187* 0.153* 0.047* 1  
 TENURE   0.028* 0.081* 0.149* 0.068* -0.016* 0.039* 1 
This table is descriptive statistics for the pilot CEOs. The sample contain 245 pilot CEOs in this study. Panel A reports the 
certificate levels attained by the pilot CEOs. Panel B reports the number of pilot CEOs by aircraft certificate ratings. These 
ratings are not mutually exclusive. Panel C reports the correlation coefficients for a variety of CEO characteristics, with * 
denoting correlations significant at 5% level or greater.   
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Firm-Year Observations  
Panel A  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
Dependent Variables      
CASH 17,860 0.156 0.164 0.028 0.089 0.213 
Firm Characteristics      
NWC 17,860 0.074 0.149 -0.013 0.064 0.163 
LEVERAGE 17,860 0.226 0.200 0.066 0.211 0.337 
CF_VOL 17,860 0.039 0.064 0.014 0.023 0.040 
MB 17,860 2.056 1.485 1.225 1.589 2.247 
SIZE 17,860 7.362 1.591 6.236 7.233 8.373 
DIVIDENT 17,860 0.506 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
CAPEX 17,860 0.055 0.054 0.021 0.038 0.069 
AQU 17,860 0.030 0.063 0.000 0.001 0.027 
CFL 17,860 0.079 0.091 0.050 0.083 0.118 
R&D 17,860 0.034 0.066 0.000 0.003 0.040 
TANGIBILITY 17,860 0.277 0.222 0.105 0.209 0.391 
SALES_G 17,860 1.117 0.628 0.991 1.073 1.173 
ROE 17,860 0.155 0.128 0.096 0.148 0.211 
CEO Characteristics      
VEGA 17,860 3.411 1.822 2.358 3.625 4.692 
DELTA 17,860 5.128 1.721 4.067 5.117 6.209 
CASH_COM 17,860 1062.259 1476.473 501.000 772.231 1150.000 
OVERCON 17,860 0.770 0.421 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AGE 17,860 3.987 0.147 3.892 3.989 4.078 
TENURE 17,860 6.759 4.957 3.000 6.000 9.000 
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Panel B      Non-pilot CEOs 
Mean 
    Pilot CEOs  
Mean 
t-test 
 N    Mean    N      Mean Difference p-value 
Dependent Variable        
CASH 16,153 0.149 1,707 0.162    -0.013* 0.088 
Firm Characteristics       
NWC 16,153 0.076 1,707 0.047  0.028*** 0.000 
LEVERAGE 16,153 0.225 1,707 0.236    -0.011** 0.021 
CFL_VOL 16,153 0.039 1,707 0.038     0.002 0.352 
MB 16,153 2.117 1,707 2.049     0.068* 0.096 
SIZE 16,153 7.254 1,707 7.676 -7.286*** 0.000 
CAPEX 16,153 0.056 1,707 0.057    -0.001 0.444 
AQU 16,153 0.029 1,707 0.026     0.002 0.201 
CFL 16,153 0.073 1,707 0.078    -0.005** 0.032 
R&D 16,153 0.035 1,707 0.036    -0.001 0.768 
TANGIBILITY 16,153 0.272 1,707 0.294 -0.022*** 0.000 
SALES_G 16,153 1.145 1,707 1.111     0.035 0.481 
ROE 16,153 0.157 1,707 0.154     0.003 0.350 
DIVIDENT 16,153 0.489 1,707 0.563    -0.074 0.000 
CEO Characteristics        
AGE 16,153 4.000 1,707 3.980  0.012*** 0.000 
TENURE 16,153 6.383 1,707 6.783  -0.400*** 0.000 
CASH_COM 16,153 972.564 1,707 1076.925 -104.361*** 0.000 
DELTA 16,153 4.780 1,707 4.933  -0.154*** 0.000 
VEGA 16,153 3.140 1,707 3.503  -0.362*** 0.000 
OVERCONFIDENCE 16,153 0.784 1,707 0.792     -0.008*** 0.380 
This table reports summary statistics for both firm characteristics and CEO statistics. The sample is based on all pilot CEOs and 
non-pilot CEOs from the ExecuComp 1992-2015 identified at Fig.1 and the firms were matched to these CEOs. Differences 
between the means for pilot CEOs firms and non-pilot CEOs firms are tested using t-tests (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests). The 
symbols ***, **, and * denote significant differences between the firms with and without pilot CEOs at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. 
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Table 3  
Pilot CEOs and Corporate Cash Holdings                         
Variables  Coefficients p-value 
PILOT 
 
                     0.014** (0.049) 
VEGA                     -0.003*** (0.006) 
DELTA                      0.007*** (0.000) 
CASH_COM                     -0.000 (0.423) 
OVERCONFIDENCE                     -0.001 (0.809) 
AGE                      -0.018 (0.171) 
TENURE                        0.001*** (0.000) 
NWC                     -0.204*** (0.000) 
LEVERAGE                     -0.126*** (0.000) 
CFL_VOL                      0.051 (0.130) 
MB                      0.013*** (0.000) 
SIZE                     -0.021*** (0.000) 
DVIDEND                     -0.006 (0.166) 
CAPEX                     -0.229*** (0.000) 
AQU                     -0.225*** (0.000) 
CFL                     -0.020 (0.574) 
R&D                      0.226*** (0.000) 
TANGIBILITY                     -0.180*** (0.000) 
SALES_G                      0.002 (0.408) 
ROE                      -0.023 (0.497) 
Constant                      0.340*** (0.000) 
Industry Fixed Effect                        Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effect                        Yes 
 
No. of observations                      17,860 
 
Adjusted R-squared                      0.493 
 
This table reports the results from OLS regressions of corporate cash holdings on pilot CEOs. Variables definitions are provided 
in the Appendix 1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and year.  p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Table 6.1  1  
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Table 4 
Pilot CEOs and the Value of Cash Holdings 
Variables                   Coefficients                    p-value 
PILOT 1.310***   (0.000) 
PILOT*∆CASH 1.753** (0.037) 
∆CASH  0.837 (0.204) 
∆EARN 0.078 (0.616) 
∆NA 0.524*** (0.000) 
∆R&D 0.742 (0.554) 
∆I -9.072** (0.010) 
∆D  9.823** (0.033) 
CASH  -0.752*** (0.000) 
LEV -2.291*** (0.000) 
CASH*∆CASH -0.050 (0.212) 
LEVERAGE*∆CASH -0.038 (0.959) 
NEWFIN -0.960*** (0.002) 
DELTA 0.086*** (0.000) 
VEGA 0.235*** (0.000) 
DELTA*∆CASH 0.313* (0.074) 
VEGA*∆CASH 0.364* (0.082) 
Constant  -1.439*** (0.000) 
Industry Fixed Effect                     Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effect                     Yes  
No. of observations 
This table repots the OLS 
regressions of the market 
value of cash holdings on 
pilot CEOs. Dependent 
variables in all models is 
the excess returns.   
 
                   19,015  
Adjusted R-squared  0.389  
This table represents the effect of pilot CEOs on the value of cash holdings. Variables definitions are provided in the Appendix 
1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and year. p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Certificate Levels and Corporate Cash Holdings 
Variables Coefficients p-value 
HIGHLEVEL                      0.040*** (0.009) 
LOWLEVEL                      0.005 (0.481) 
VEGA                     -0.002** (0.042) 
DELTA                      0.006*** (0.000) 
CASH_COM                     -0.000 (0.637) 
OVERCONFIDENCE                      0.001 (0.607) 
AGE                     -0.006 (0.661) 
TENURE                      0.001** (0.018) 
NWC                     -0.265*** (0.000) 
LEVERAGE                     -0.132*** (0.000) 
CFL_VOL                     0.108*** (0.006) 
MB                     0.012*** (0.000) 
SIZE                    -0.026*** (0.000) 
DVIDEND                    -0.007 (0.118) 
CAPEX                    -0.240*** (0.000) 
AQU                    -0.250*** (0.000) 
CFL                    -0.067* (0.097) 
R&D                     0.235*** (0.000) 
TANGIBILITY                    -0.202*** (0.000) 
SALES_G                     0.001 (0.698) 
ROE                    -0.008 (0.806) 
Constant                    0.351*** (0.000) 
Industry Fixed Effect                     Yes  
Year Fixed Effect                     Yes  
No. of observations                   17,860  
Adjusted R-squared                    0.569  
This table reports the results from OLS regressions of corporate cash holdings on pilot CEOs. Variables definitions are provided 
in the Appendix 1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and year.  p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Table 7.1  1  
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Table 6 
Certificate Levels and the Value of Cash Holdings  
 Variables                    Coefficients                  p-value 
HIGHLEVEL 1.469*** (0.000) 
LOWLEVEL  1.239** (0.000) 
HIGHLEVEL*∆CASH 5.796*** (0.007) 
LOWLEVEL*∆CASH 1.064 (0.227) 
∆CASH  0.735 (0.267) 
∆EARN 0.067 (0.664) 
∆NA 0.513*** (0.000) 
∆R&D 0.766 (0.544) 
∆I -9.103** (0.010) 
∆D  9.769** (0.034) 
CASH  -0.748*** (0.000) 
LEV -2.304*** (0.000) 
CASH*∆CASH -0.053 (0.188) 
LEVERAGE*∆CASH 0.023 (0.974) 
NEWFIN -0.957*** (0.002) 
DELTA 0.086*** (0.000) 
VEGA 0.234*** (0.000) 
DELTA*∆CASH -0.310* (0.079) 
VEGA*∆CASH 0.369* (0.079) 
Constant  -1.436*** (0.000) 
Industry Fixed Effect                      Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effect                      Yes  
No. of observations                    19,015  
Adjusted R-squared    0.402  
This table represents the effect of pilot CEOs on the value of cash holdings. Variables definitions are provided in the Appendix 
1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and year. p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Subsample Analysis: Growth Opportunities 
 Low Growth Opportunities   High Growth Opportunities  
Variables  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
PILOT     0.015* (0.064)   0.026** (0.022) 
VEGA  -0.001 (0.398)  -0.004** (0.011) 
DELTA      0.006*** (0.000)    0.008*** (0.000) 
CASH_COM      0.000*** (0.003)   -0.000*** (0.001) 
OVERCONFIDENCE 
 
-0.001 (0.812)  0.006* (0.096) 
AGE  -0.012 (0.371)           0.007 (0.702) 
TENURE    0.000 (0.983)   0.001** (0.025) 
NWC     -0.286*** (0.000)    -0.260*** (0.000) 
LEVERAGE     -0.172*** (0.000)    -0.098*** (0.000) 
CFL_VOL      0.123*** (0.009)           0.046 (0.277) 
MB 0.000 (0.424)          -0.000 (0.180) 
SIZE      -0.027*** (0.000)    -0.026*** (0.000) 
DVIDEND    -0.011** (0.030)          -0.010 (0.113) 
CAPEX    -0.257*** (0.000)    -0.206*** (0.000) 
AQU    -0.166*** (0.000)    -0.405*** (0.000) 
CFL -0.072* (0.054)    -0.097*** (0.007) 
R&D     0.241*** (0.009)    0.240*** (0.000) 
TANGIBILITY    -0.170*** (0.000)   -0.291*** (0.000) 
SALES_G 0.000 (0.981)  0.008** (0.019) 
ROE         -0.044 (0.193)          0.026 (0.374) 
Constant    0.414*** (0.000)  0.376*** (0.000) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes   Yes  
Year Fixed Effect Yes   Yes  
No. of observations  9,673   8,187  
Adjusted R-squared 0.556   0.607  
This table reports the results from OLS regressions of corporate cash holdings on pilot CEOs. Variables definitions are provided 
in the Appendix 1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and year. p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Subsample Analysis: Financial Constraints 
 Financially unconstrained  Financially constrained 
Variables  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
PILOT            0.015 (0.139)     0.020** (0.038) 
VEGA   -0.004*** (0.006)          -0.002 (0.185) 
DELTA    0.008*** (0.000)      0.009*** (0.000) 
CASH_COM   -0.000*** (0.007)      0.000*** (0.001) 
OVERCONFIDENCE 
 
         0.005 (0.123)  0.002 (0.691) 
AGE           0.005 (0.769)          -0.027 (0.100) 
TENURE            0.001* (0.066)  0.000 (0.652) 
NWC  -0.301*** (0.000)     -0.282*** (0.000) 
LEVERAGE  -0.111*** (0.000)     -0.151*** (0.000) 
CFL_VOL 0.124** (0.016)    0.095** (0.022) 
MB          0.000 (0.657)          -0.000 (0.742) 
SIZE   -0.029*** (0.000)     -0.026*** (0.000) 
DVIDEND         -0.011* (0.069)     -0.018*** (0.001) 
CAPEX -0.233*** (0.000)     -0.227*** (0.000) 
AQU -0.329*** (0.000)     -0.246*** (0.000) 
CFL -0.151*** (0.000)    -0.074** (0.047) 
R&D  0.245*** (0.000)      0.295*** (0.000) 
TANGIBILITY -0.241*** (0.000)     -0.214*** (0.000) 
SALES_G        -0.001 (0.309)      0.009*** (0.002) 
ROE  0.093*** (0.008)  0.027 (0.464) 
Constant 0.402*** (0.000)      0.451*** (0.000) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes   Yes  
Year Fixed Effect Yes   Yes  
No. of observations  9,004   8,856  
Adjusted R-squared 0.584   0.573  
This table reports the results from OLS regressions of corporate cash holdings on pilot CEOs. Variables definitions are provided 
in the Appendix 1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and year. p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 9 
Pilot CEO Turnover Analysis  
Variables  Coefficients  p-value 
PILOTTURNOVER     0.052** (0.013) 
∆VEGA  0.001 (0.918) 
∆DELTA -0.006 (0.362) 
∆CASH_COM  0.000 (0.473) 
∆OVERCONFIDENCE -0.002 (0.948) 
∆AGE -0.004 (0.937) 
∆TENURE  0.003 (0.122) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  
Year Fixed Effect Yes  
No. of observations 319  
Adjusted R-squared 0.025  
This table reports the results from OLS regression of change in corporate cash holdings on change in pilot CEOs for after 
controlling for other CEO characteristics changes. The changes estimated from year t-1 to year t+1. Change in cash holdings is 
measured as the difference between the cash-to-asset ratio (CASH) after the new CEO takes office and the cash-to-asset ratio 
measured when the previous CEO was in power. The pilot CEO turnover (PILOTTURNOVER) year is year t-1.  ***, **, and * 
denote significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
Table 10 
Pilot CEOs and Corporate Cash Holdings (Controlling for Military Experience) 
Variables  Coefficients p-value 
PILOT                      0.028* (0.051) 
MILITARY                     0.020 (0.169) 
VEGA                    -0.002 (0.101) 
DELTA                     0.004** (0.043) 
CASH_COM                     0.000 (0.367) 
OVERCONFIDENCE                    -0.001 (0.922) 
AGE                      0.013 (0.518) 
TENURE                      -0.000 (0.889) 
NWC                    -0.188*** (0.000) 
LEVERAGE                    -0.092*** (0.000) 
CFL_VOL                     0.313*** (0.000) 
MB                     0.000 (0.510) 
SIZE                     -0.016*** (0.000) 
DVIDEND                     0.001 (0.881) 
CAPEX                    -0.231*** (0.006) 
AQU                    -0.138*** (0.000) 
CFL                    -0.055 (0.334) 
R&D                     0.316*** (0.002) 
TANGIBILITY                    -0.104*** (0.000) 
SALES_G                    -0.001 (0.940) 
ROE                      0.060 (0.218) 
Constant                     0.277*** (0.004) 
Industry Fixed Effect                      Yes  
Year Fixed Effect                      Yes  
No. of observations                      4,174  
Adjusted R-squared                     0.306  
This table reports the results from OLS regressions of corporate cash holdings on pilot CEOs. Variables definitions are provided 
in the Appendix 1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and year. p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 11  
Pilot CEOs and Corporate Cash Holdings (Log of Cash-to-Assets Ratio)                    
Variables  Coefficients p-value 
PILOT 
 
                      0.133*** (0.008) 
VEGA                      -0.014 (0.156) 
DELTA                       0.030** (0.013) 
CASH_COM                      -0.000 (0.191) 
OVERCONFIDENCE                       0.039* (0.095) 
AGE                        0.028 (0.795) 
TENURE                         0.004** (0.031) 
NWC                      -1.591*** (0.000) 
LEVERAGE                      -1.179*** (0.000) 
CFL_VOL                       0.798*** (0.002) 
MB                       0.098*** (0.000) 
SIZE                      -0.105*** (0.000) 
DVIDEND                      -0.082** (0.041) 
CAPEX                      -1.355*** (0.000) 
AQU                      -2.034*** (0.000) 
CFL                      -0.487*** (0.007) 
R&D                       0.672** (0.017) 
TANGIBILITY                      -1.605*** (0.000) 
SALES_G                      -0.012 (0.386) 
ROE                        0.359** (0.024) 
Constant                      -1.712*** (0.001) 
Industry Fixed Effect                        Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effect                        Yes 
 
No. of observations                       17,860 
 
Adjusted. R-square squared                       0.519 
 
This table reports the results from OLS regressions of corporate cash holdings on pilot CEOs. Variables definitions are provided 
in the Appendix 1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and year. p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Appendix 1. Variable Definitions  
 
CEO characteristics  Definition Data source  
PILOT An indicator variable equal to 1 if CEO has had certificate in FAA 
airmen database, and 0 otherwise. 
FAA 
DELTA Dollar change in CEO stock and option portfolio value for a 1% 
change in stock price.  
 
VEGA Dollar change in CEO option holdings value for a 1% change in 
stock return volatility.  
 
CASH_COM (SALARY+BONUS) ExecuComp  
OVERCONFIDENCE  An indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO’s options exceed 100% 
moneyness in the current period or any prior period. 
ExecuComp 
TENURE Number of years of service as CEO at given firm. ExecuComp 
AGE The natural logarithm of CEO’s age ExecuComp 
Firm characteristics   
NWC Net working capital is defined as working capital minus cash 
holdings scaled by total assets (WCAP-CHE)/AT. 
Compustat 
LEVERAGE The sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by 
total assets (DLTT + DLC)/AT. 
 
MB  Market-to-book ratio is measured as the market value of equity plus 
the book value of total assets reduced by the book value of equity, 
then divided by the total assets (CSHO*PRCC_F+AT-CEQ)/AT. 
Compustat 
SIZE  Firm size is measures as natural logarithm of total assets (AT).  Compustat 
CAPEX Capital expenditure is measured as a ratio of total capital 
expenditures divided by the total assets CAPX/AT. 
Compustat 
DIVIDEND An indicator variable equal one in years in which a firm pays a 
common dividend (DVC) and zero otherwise. 
Compustat 
AQU Acquisition is measured as the current year total acquisitions 
expenses scaled by total assets AQC/AT. 
 
CFL  Free cash flow is measured as earnings after interest, tax and 
dividend, divided by total assets (OIBDP-XINT-TXT-DVC)/AT. 
 
R&D R&D is measured as the total research and development expenses 
scaled by total assets XRD/AT. 
Compustat 
TANGIBILITY Tangibility is measured as the net value of property, plants, and 
equipment divided by total assets PPENT/AT. 
Compustat 
SALES_G Sales growth is measured as the current year total revenue (REVT) 
divided by the one year lagged total revenue. 
Compustat 
ROE Return on equity is measured as a ratio of earnings before interest 
(EBITDA) divided by one year lagged total assets (AT).  
Compustat 
EARN Earnings before extraordinary items (OIDBP). Compustat 
NA Net assets, calculated by total assets minus cash and marketable 
securities (AT−CHE). 
Compustat 
I Interest expenses (XINT) Compustat 
D Common dividends (DVC). Compustat 
NEWFIN Net new finance at year t, is measured as the sum of net new equity 
issues (SSTK-PRSTKC) and net new debt issues (DLTIS-DLTR).  
Compustat 
 
